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FEDERAL LABOR LAW AND THE MASHANTUCKET 
PEQUOT: UNION ORGANIZING AT FOXWOODS CASINO 
Derek Ghan* 
I. Introduction 
The Mashantucket Pequot’s gaming enterprise has allowed the Pequot 
Reservation to reemerge with a definable cultural identity. Given how close 
this once powerful presence came to extinction, the Tribe has been active 
and aggressive in exercising its sovereign right to retain complete autonomy 
and control over its gaming enterprises.  
It should come as no surprise that in 2008, the Tribe was less than 
enthusiastic to find itself in the midst of an organizing campaign at 
Foxwoods Casino — one in which the National Labor Relations Board, the 
federal labor relations administrative agency, declared it had the jurisdiction 
to regulate the Casino’s workforce. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
established federal jurisdiction over labor relations on reservations two 
years earlier in San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB;1 however, the 
distinctively central role that tribal casinos play in the survival and cultural 
development of most tribes calls for a specialized and coherent policy that 
recognizes and addresses the idiosyncrasies of labor organizing campaigns 
at tribal casinos. The United Auto Workers (“UAW”) campaign at 
Foxwoods illustrates the possibilities and pitfalls of such a campaign. 
 During the UAW Foxwoods campaign, the Pequot perceived a threat to 
the Casino as a threat to the Tribe’s very survival. The campaign at 
Foxwoods revealed tension between a tribe that fought an uphill battle to 
achieve economic sustainability and a workforce looking for a respectable 
wage, job security, and a healthy work environment.  Balance can be 
achieved between these competing interests — the interest of the workforce 
and that of tribal sovereignty.  Federal regulators, however, missed an 
opportunity to strike this balance by not crafting an explicit policy in this 
emerging intersection of labor and tribal law. 
                                                                                                                 
 * J.D. University of Connecticut School of Law 2012, B.A. Seattle Pacific University 
2005. I would like to thank Professor Bethany Berger for her guidance as well as my peers at 
the University Connecticut School of Law, particularly Elizabeth Kreick for her valuable 
contributions and editorial eye. I would also like to thank my wife Adriana for her patience 
and support. Finally, I am grateful for the editorial support from the staff of the American 
Indian Law Review.  
 1. 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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The most apparent symbol of the Tribe’s departure from its troubled 
past2 is the massive gaming complex it has constructed. As you drive east 
on Route Two and slowly reach the crest of a small incline, you see the 
trees open up for the monument to the Tribe’s economic success. The 
Foxwoods Resort Casino stands like a metropolitan oasis in the forested 
area of southeastern Connecticut.3 It has been described as the largest 
casino resort in the Western Hemisphere.4 The Casino is the product of an 
aggressive campaign to rehabilitate the disappearing Tribe.  A small cadre 
of Pequots initiated that campaign in the early 1970s, led by the grandson of 
one of the last remaining members on the reservation.5  
Since the launch of the gaming enterprise, the Tribe’s on-reservation 
population has grown exponentially. Economic success drew members back 
to the reservation whose families had left in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries in search of better wages than could be offered by the Tribe.  
As the Casino brought prosperity, the Tribe focused its attention on the 
study of the Mashantucket Pequot’s culture and ethnohistory. This new 
focus developed in tandem with the reemergence of the Tribe’s on-
reservation population, serving the dual purpose of educating the non-
Native public as well as the newer generation of the Pequot community.  
This Article will analyze how the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe (“Tribe” or 
“Pequot”), the pro-union campaigners, and the National Labor Relations 
Board (“NLRB” or “the Board”) responded to the 2008 union organizing 
campaign at Foxwoods Casino in light of the Casino’s role in the Tribe’s 
survival and cultural reemergence. To better understand the Tribe’s 
contemporary decision making, it is necessary to first examine the historical 
context in which the Tribe evolved.  
Part II will survey the historic relationship of the Pequot with the State of 
Connecticut as well as the federal government. Part III will address some 
modern milestones in the Tribe’s development that set it apart as a unique 
case study from other native nation’s rebuilding stories. Part IV will 
introduce the labor organizing campaigns beginning in 2007, focusing on 
the campaign conducted with the help of the UAW Union on behalf of the 
Foxwoods table game dealers.  
                                                                                                                 
 2. See infra Part II.  
 3. Michael Sokolove, Foxwoods Is Fighting for Its Life, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 14, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/18/magazine/mike-sokolove-foxwood-casinos.htm 
l?pagewanted=all. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. 
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Finally, Part V will evaluate the tribal, union, and federal agencies’ 
responses to the organizing campaign in light of the inimitable cultural re-
emergence and economic development of the Tribe. The Tribe’s evolution 
greatly influenced how the Tribe viewed the organizing campaign as well 
as how it strategically responded. Additionally, this section will examine 
the response of both the union and the NLRB and evaluate the two 
organizations’ roles. This article argues that the NLRB missed an 
opportunity to develop crucial labor regulation policy at tribal casinos; 
however, by simply acknowledging the unique history and circumstances of 
the Pequot, the union was better able to produce substantive results that 
appeased both the organizing employees and the Tribe.   
II. A Brief History of the Mashantucket Pequot: From First Contact to the 
1970s 
The story of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, like many other stories of 
native tribes after Anglo contact, is one laden with tragedy. During pre-
colonial and the early colonial eras, the Pequot held significant economic 
influence in the region due to the Tribe’s control over the wampum trade.6 
Wampum, a small tubular bead made from a specific crustacean, acted as 
the preferred currency among tribes in the southern New England region.7 
Indeed, European colonials, particularly the Dutch and English, quickly 
recognized the importance of wampum in the fur trade.8 They created a 
trade triangle, first exchanging manufactured European goods for wampum 
in the coastal regions, then sailing inland to exchange the wampum for furs, 
which they then sold for enormous profits in Europe.9 The Tribe was 
strategically positioned between the inland fur traders and the weaker 
coastal bead-makers, making the Pequot the de facto “mintmasters” of the 
southern New England wampum trade.10 
The spike in trade activity after the arrival of the European colonists 
shoved the Pequot into the economic spotlight, making the Tribe one of the 
most rich and powerful groups in the region. Noted nineteenth-century 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See Lynn Ceci, Native Wampum as a Peripheral Resource in the Seventeenth-
Century World-System, in THE PEQUOTS IN SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND: THE FALL AND RISE OF 
AN AMERICAN INDIAN NATION 48, 59 (Laurence M. Hauptman & James D. Wherry eds., 
1990) [hereinafter THE PEQUOTS IN SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND]. 
 7. Id. at 48-49. 
 8. Id. at 55-58. 
 9. Id. at 58-59. 
 10. Id. at 59-60. 
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historian John De Forest11 characterized the Tribe as “the most numerous, 
the most warlike, the fiercest and the bravest of all the aboriginal clans of 
Connecticut.”12 The earliest accounts of European contact with the Pequot 
date as far back as 1614, but it was not until the early 1630s that the Pequot 
had regular interactions with both the Dutch and English.13  
The Dutch were the first to establish trade relations with the Pequot.14 In 
1633, the Dutch purchased a small tract of land along the Connecticut River 
from the Pequot, and sought to establish it as a safe haven for trading in the 
river valley, free from harassment and violence.15 Soon after the Dutch 
established this safe trade zone, the Pequot violated Dutch terms by killing 
members of a rival tribe in the area.16 This act so incensed the Dutch that 
the Dutch carried out their own brand of justice by executing the Pequot 
Grand Sachem Wopigwooit and several of his men.17 A brief war between 
the Dutch and Pequot ensued, severing the trade ties between the two 
groups.18 De Forest attributes the later doomed relationship between the 
Pequot and English Puritan settlers to the execution of Wopigwooit and the 
subsequent war with the Dutch.19  
Tales of a flourishing and prosperous fur trade in the Connecticut Valley 
persuaded the English settlers in the Massachusetts colonies to petition then 
Governor Winthrop to send a contingent to the area to establish a trade 
relationship.20 Winthrop, however, was hesitant to oblige, having heard that 
the tribes in the area were not easily pacified and the landscape offered little 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Anglo accounts of tribal histories are often prone to misconceptions of tribal culture; 
however, for the purpose of this article, it is important to understand European conceptions 
of the Tribe. 
 12. JOHN W. DE FOREST, HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF CONNECTICUT FROM THE EARLIEST 
KNOWN PERIOD TO 1850, at 58 (Hartford, Wm. Jas. Hamersley 1851).  The indigenous 
tribes’ pre-contact warfare was very different from the type of war that historians such as De 
Forest would have known. Because tribes had small, dispersed populations and could not 
afford many deaths, tribes only waged war in order to settle boundary disputes, expand 
territory, or avenge insults. Men fought the wars and women and children were usually 
spared. Michael Freeman, Puritans and Pequots: The Question of Genocide, 68 NEW ENG. 
Q. 278, 285 (1995).  
 13. William A. Starna, The Pequots in the Early Seventeenth Century, in THE PEQUOTS 
IN SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND, supra note 6, at 33, 34. 
 14. DE FOREST, supra note 12, at 71-73.  
 15. Id. at 72. 
 16. Id. at 73. 
 17. Id. “Sachem” is the term that area tribes used for their head or chief. Id. at 30. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. at 74-76. 
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in natural defenses.21 Winthrop eventually relented and the first English 
settlement set out from Massachusetts in the early 1630s.22 A rift in the 
relationship between the Pequot and English occurred when the English 
settlers arrived in the Connecticut River Valley escorting a tribal chief the 
Pequot had exiled after conquering the chief’s tribe.23 At that moment, the 
English settlers had unintentionally hurled their first insult at the Pequot.24 
The relationship continued its downward trajectory when the English 
refused to recognize Pequot title25 to the territory.26 De Forest opined that 
this may have been a result of the English settlers’ negative view of the 
Pequot as intruders and thieves.27 His alternative theory was that the Dutch 
had previously acknowledged Pequot title to the land, but the English 
settlers had to deny title to give the appearance of denying Dutch authority 
in the area.28  Returning with the exiled chief, refusing to acknowledge 
Pequot title to the land, and the execution of Wopigwooit combined to fuel 
the flames between the Pequot and the English.  
In the summer of 1633, Captain John Stone, a slaver and privateer, sailed 
up the Connecticut River, forever altering the course of Pequot history.29 
History has not looked kindly on Stone’s legacy. De Forest, for one, 
described Captain Stone as “dissolute” and “intemperate.”30 Following his 
arrival in the river valley, the Pequot killed Stone and his crew, claiming it 
was necessary in order to rescue two kidnapped Pequots Stone had captured 
and forced to pilot his vessel up the river.31  
                                                                                                                 
 21. See id. at 75. 
 22. Id. at 74-75. 
 23. See id. at 76. 
 24. Id.  
 25. For a discussion of aboriginal title and the Discovery Doctrine, see Kathleen Sands, 
Territory, Wilderness, Property, and Reservation: Land and Religion in Native American 
Supreme Court Cases 36 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 253, 269-70 (2011-2012) and Blake A. 
Watson, The Doctrine of Discovery and the Elusive Definition of Indian Title, 15 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 995 (2011).  
 26. DE FOREST, supra note 12, at 76. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. In their quest to appropriate new lands under the guise of legal legitimacy, it 
likely behooved the English colonists refused to acknowledge Dutch authority to recognize 
or confer title to land.   
 29. Id. at 77. 
 30. Id. Other historians have been even less kind in their accounts of Captain John 
Stone, describing him as a rogue who was kicked out of Plymouth before he could be tried 
for other crimes. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 12, at 286-87. 
 31. DE FOREST, supra note 12, at 77-78. 
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The deaths of Captain Stone and his crew caused open war.  The Pequot 
were pitted against the English and other lesser tribes that allied with the 
English in order to prevent Pequot expansion of authority throughout the 
river valley.32 The ensuing war peaked in a bloody battle that decimated the 
Pequot population. On May 26, 1637, a contingent of English soldiers 
accompanied by their Narragansett and Mohegan allies surrounded the 
Pequot fort in Mystic and set fire to the wigwams therein.33 Some Pequots 
died in the fort at the hands of their enemies or from the flames; others fled 
the burning fort to a line of hostile musket fire from the enemy 
contingencies.34 
The death toll varies from account to account, but the general consensus 
is that less than a score of the Fort Mystic Pequots survived the attack. 35 
Following the Fort Mystic campaign, the Pequot fled west to escape 
English attack.36 This retreat concluded the war and ended just as violently 
with an estimated 700 Pequots dead.37 Among the dead was the last great 
Chief of the Pequot, Sassacus, as well as thirteen of the twenty-six 
remaining chiefs.38 About 300 total surviving Pequots — mostly women 
and children — were sold into slavery throughout the English colonies.39 In 
1638, 200 of the Pequot that had not been sold into slavery to the British 
American and Caribbean colonies were divided among or willingly fled to 
live with the Mohegan and Narragansett.40 The land formerly owned by the 
Pequot was to become the property of the English colonists; and the Pequot 
were to become Mohegan, Narragansett, and Eastern Niantic.41 They did 
not live in their ancient land nor identify with their ancient name.42 De 
Forest concludes his account of the Pequot War with this summation: “Such 
was the peace which closed the famous Pequot War; and thus, for a time, 
was the national existence of that brave though savage people 
extinguished.”43 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Freeman, supra note 12, at 288. 
 33. Id. 
 34. DE FOREST, supra note 12, at 131-33.  
 35. See id. at 133; Freeman, supra note 12, at 288-89.  
 36. DE FOREST, supra note 12, at 152. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Michael L. Fickes, “They Could Not Endure That Yoke": The Captivity of Pequot 
Women and Children After the War of 1637, 73 NEW ENG. Q. 58, 61-62 (2000). 
 40. DE FOREST, supra note 12, at 160. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
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Pequot history subsequent to the 1637 war is best described by 
ethnohistorian Jack Campisi: “Two themes run through Pequot history: a 
tenacious persistence to maintain the tribal identity and an unswerving 
struggle to hold on to tribal land.”44 By 1650, most Pequots held in captivity 
as slaves or as tributes to the other tribes had managed to find a way to 
escape from living under their direct control and re-establish some 
semblance of autonomy.45 Notably, some of the tribes tasked with taking 
custody of the captives following the war either gave their Pequot wards 
great latitude in self-determination or assimilated them as part of their own 
tribe.46 Two specific groups regained their independence, the Western 
(Mashantucket) Pequot, originally under control of the Narragansett, and 
the Eastern Pequot, originally under control of the Mohegan.47 The English 
colonists established four Indian towns, two for the Western Pequot and 
two for the Eastern Pequot.48 
By the end of the seventeenth century, the English colonists had assumed 
the position of trustee/protector over the Pequot, a role typical of the federal 
government after the birth of the new nation.49 The colonial governor 
officially recognized the East and West Pequot as two distinct tribes.50 They 
developed as “two separate social and political entities” with autonomous, 
albeit similar, cultural identity.51 The Connecticut colony granted a 2000-
acre tract of land in the town of Ledyard, known as Mashantucket;52 but the 
Western Pequot were insistent on a land grant at the headwater of Mystic 
River requested by their leader, Cassacinamon.53 Because the Western 
Pequot were insistent on the grant of a different tract of land, few initially 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Jack Campisi, The Emergence of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 1637-1975, in 
THE PEQUOTS IN SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND, supra note 6, at 117, 117. 
 45. Fickes, supra note 39, at 73. 
 46. Id. at 76-77.  
 47. Campisi, supra note 44, at 118. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. at 119-20; see also John Fredericks III, Indian Lands: Financing Indian 
Agriculture: Mortgaged Indian Lands and the Federal Trust Responsibility, 14 AM. INDIAN 
L. REV. 105, 107-21 (1989) (discussing the federal government’s role as the fiduciary over 
tribal land and investments).  
 50. Campisi, supra note 44, at 119-20. 
 51. Id. 
 52. RICHARD RADUNE, PEQUOT PLANTATION: THE STORY OF AN EARLY COLONIAL 
SETTLEMENT 158 (2005). 
 53. KIM ISAAC EISLER, REVENGE OF THE PEQUOTS: HOW A SMALL NATIVE AMERICAN 
TRIBE CREATED THE WORLD’S MOST PROFITABLE CASINO 42 (2002). 
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occupied Mashantucket; but by the time of Cassacinamon’s death, most of 
the Western Pequot had migrated to Mashantucket.54  
In 1722, the Tribe’s state-appointed overseer accused the heirs of John 
Winthrop, Jr. of stealing 500 acres of Mashantucket land.55 While the 
allegations were never completely substantiated, the English, who wanted 
land title, made a compromise in 1732 with the Mashantucket Pequot, who 
sought to retain their land in its entirety.56 The compromise divided the land 
in half, making half available for lease to the English colonists, while the 
Pequot retained the right to use the other half.57 The compromise did little 
to quell the growing resentment of the English colonists who wanted 
underlying title to this leased land.58 In 1761, the colonists were finally 
successful in securing title and extinguishing any future claims the Pequot 
might have had under the act.59 The 1761 campaign reduced the 
Mashantucket Pequot reservation to 989 acres, less than half of the original 
grant.60 
Over the next two centuries, the Pequot population dwindled while 
illegal land sales increased.61 A 1774 census recorded 151 Pequot living on 
Mashantucket; however, the number fell to less than fifty by the 1800s, as 
members left the reservation to pursue other financial ventures.62 The 
acreage of Mashantucket diminished at the hands of the Tribe’s overseers. 
In 1855, the Connecticut General Assembly passed a law that allowed 
newly appointed overseers to sell nearly 80% of the Mashantucket land, 
leaving only 180 acres of the reservation intact.63  
While the sale of the tribal land served as a source of funding for the 
Tribe, the absence of any viable economic development at Mashantucket 
                                                                                                                 
 54. See id. 
 55. Campisi, supra note 44, at 120. 
 56. Id. at 121-22. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Campisi believes the success of 1761 campaign was successful because many 
Pequot men had died as a result of the Tribe’s involvement in the French and Indian War. 
Thus, the remaining Pequot population dwindled and weakened due to the loss of the labor 
force available to produce food for the Tribe. Id. at 123-24.  
 60. Id. 
 61. The alienability of Indian land was first governed by the Royal Proclamation of 
1763 and subsequently by the Non-Intercourse Act passed in 1802. See Wenona T. Singel & 
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Power, Authority, and Tribal Property, 41 TULSA L. REV. 21 (2005) 
(providing a detailed survey of how Connecticut and other states violated the law of the time 
to exploit Indian territory).  
 62. Campisi, supra note 44, at 125. 
 63. Id. at 132.  
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forced members to leave the reservation in search of more sustainable work. 
Many Pequot men joined whaling ventures out of New England or went to 
mine granite in Rhode Island with the Narragansett.64 By 1935, a state 
commission census put the on-reservation population at a mere nine, with a 
remaining forty-two in the surrounding area.65   
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, limited funding — 
despite the income generated by the 1855 land sale — prevented the on-
reservation members from maintaining their households. The Tribe’s main 
source of income at the time was the interest generated by the principle 
from the Tribe’s trust fund, which was deteriorating almost as quickly as 
the on-reservation population.66 On the other hand, the Great Depression 
brought members in search of new livelihoods back to the reservation.67 
By the 1941, the state Department of Welfare took authority over the 
Mashantucket Pequot affairs.68 Through a series of tactics designed to 
divest the Mashantucket Pequot of their land and undermine the Tribe’s 
sovereignty, nearly all of the remaining Pequots living on the Mashantucket 
Reservation were forced to move off the land.69 Two Pequot women, 
Elizabeth George Plouffe and Martha Langevin Ellal, were the last 
remaining Pequots on Mashantucket, and both women knew the importance 
of protecting the remnants of their once-great nation.70 Before George 
Plouffe died in 1973, she urged her grandson, Richard “Skip” Hayward and 
the rest of his generation “to hold on to the land” and bring the Tribe back 
to Mashantucket.71  
                                                                                                                 
 64. Interview with Dr. Jason Mancini, senior researcher at the Mashantucket Pequot 
Tribal Museum (notes on file with author), at the Mashantucket Pequot Museum and 
Research Center on Mar. 23, 2012.. The Pequot worked side-by-side with the Narragansett 
and other area tribal members in Rhode Island, cultivating one of the earliest Pan-American 
Indian movements in New England, which likely played an important role in the area tribes’ 
efforts to re-establish sovereignty and autonomy. Id. 
 65. Campisi, supra note 44, at 133. 
 66. Id. at 133-34. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Robert L. Bee, Connecticut’s Indian Policy: From Testy Arrogance to Benign 
Bemusement, in THE PEQUOTS IN SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND, supra note 6, at 195. 
 69. Interview with Dr. Jason Mancini, supra note 64; see also Bee, supra note 68, at 
194-95 (explaining that the “‘people concerns’ of welfare involved economic need, not the 
preservation of Indian ethnic identity”).  
 70. JOHN J. BODINGER DE URIARTE, CASINO AND MUSEUM: REPRESENTING 
MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT IDENTITY 44 (2007). 
 71. Tribal History, MASHANTUCKET (WESTERN) PEQUOT TRIBAL NATION, http://www. 
mashantucket.com/tribalhistory.aspx (last visited May 22, 2013). 
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III. Economic Development and Mashantucket Pequot Cultural Identity 
A. Federal Recognition and Early Economic Development 
Most researchers agree that a land base is often an essential element to 
the continuity of tribal culture.72 In the case of the Mashantucket Pequot, 
opportunity and incentive were necessary to bring the Pequot back to the 
reservation and to re-establish a tribal community that preserves Pequot 
identity. 
Hayward and the few remaining Pequots, dedicated to this purpose, 
heeded Elizabeth George Plouffe’s words and began a new campaign in the 
1970s aimed at revitalizing the Tribe. The first step in the Tribe’s campaign 
became possible following the Supreme Court decision in Oneida Indian 
Nation v. County of Oneida.73 The 1974 decision declared that the Indian 
Non-Intercourse Act protected tribal lands in the original colonies.74 Armed 
with this new precedent, the Tribe aimed to negotiate a settlement for the 
disputed land, improve state/tribal relations, and earn federal recognition.75  
In addition to federal recognition and re-securing reservation land, the 
Tribe’s other specific goals were economic self-sufficiency and establishing 
adequate housing76 in order to attract members back to the reservation. 
Economic opportunity would be the draw, and the housing would be 
necessary to both quarter the returning members and re-build an on-
reservation community. Hayward led the first attempt to rebuild the 
reservation after securing a small housing grant from the Federal Housing 
and Urban Development agency.77 Using the modest grant fund, he 
commissioned a small housing complex as well as a hydroponic greenhouse 
                                                                                                                 
 72. See, e.g., Bee, supra note 68, at 195 (“As Indian groups have argued for years, both 
the land base and the cultural heritage are vital for preservation of Indian Identity.”); Robert 
D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, American Indian Law Codes: Pragmatic Law and 
Tribal Identity, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 29, 47 (2000) (“Tribes that still occupy their homeland 
have made these places sacred in their creation stories and subsequent history or myth. 
Relocated tribes do not have this connection, but generations of births and deaths make new 
places sacred.”); Mary Lawlor, Identity in Mashantucket, 57 AM. Q. 153, 160 (2005) (“In 
particular, the historicization of the tribal homeland as the ground to which the tribal 
population belongs in an autochthonous relation enables the Pequots to shape a counter 
experience to alienation and the loss of cultural articulation.”). 
 73. 414 U.S. 661 (1974). 
 74. Id. at 670.  
 75. Campisi, supra note 44, at 184. 
 76. Anne-Marie d’Hauteserre, Foxwoods Casino Resort: An Unusual Experiment in 
Economic Development, 74 ECON. GEO. 112, 114 (1998). 
 77. James D. Wherry, Afterword to THE PEQUOTS IN SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND, supra 
note 6, at 213, 214-17. 
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to grow and sell local produce.78 Unfortunately, the Tribe suffered several 
false starts before finding its industrial strengths. The hydroponic 
greenhouse venture failed to produce any significant returns, and various 
other undertakings including maple syrup manufacturing, hog farming, and 
cutting and selling cordwood were equally unsuccessful.79 
Despite the Tribe’s early, underwhelming economic ventures, by the end 
of the 1970s and into the early 1980s,80 the Tribe successfully lobbied both 
for federal recognition through an Act of Congress81 as well as improved 
relations with the State of Connecticut under Governors Meskill and 
Grasso.82  
The Tribe’s success in receiving federal recognition is largely 
attributable to its land claim suits, and in particular, the settlement of these 
claims and future claims.83 With federal recognition came the opportunity 
to take advantage of federal programs made available to help revive tribal 
economies. Although its hydroponic greenhouse failed to produce viable 
financial results,84 new funding sources through programs such as the 
Indian Government Tax Status Act85 provided the Tribe some economic 
sustainability while it worked to become self-sufficient.  
The Tribe’s first economic success came shortly after it received federal 
recognition. Thanks to a Connecticut law that allowed charitable bingo 
operations, the Tribe made its first foray into on-reservation gambling.86 
The Tribe enjoyed modest success with its high stakes bingo operation.87 
With the help of a Supreme Court decision that “affirmed the inherent, 
sovereign rights of Indian tribes to engage in their chosen paths to 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 215-16; see also BODINGER DE URIARTE, supra note 70, at 44. 
 80. It is also important to note here that during this time, there was a shift in Federal 
policy as well as public sentiment that favored greater sovereignty and more opportunities 
for economic development for native tribes. See, e.g., d’Hauteserre, supra note 76, at 114. 
 81. Connecticut Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1760 (2006).  
 82. See Bee, supra note 68, at 198-207. The Mashantucket Pequot path to federal 
recognition was a unique one. Rather than petitioning with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, a 
process the Tribe believed would likely be unsuccessful, members successfully lobbied 
Congress for federal legislation in the 1970s. After President Reagan vetoed the initial 
legislation in 1982, the Tribe managed to lobby for a new version of the Act in 1983, which 
was signed by the Reagan administration. Mashantucket Pequot Indian Claims Settlement 
Act, Pub. L. No. 98-134, 97 Stat. 853 (1983).  
 83. See Wherry, supra note 77, at 216. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Pub. L. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2605 (1982). 
 86. Wherry, supra note 77, at 218-19. 
 87.  BODINGER DE URIARTE, supra note 70, at 46. 
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economic development,” the Tribe resisted state political pressure aimed at 
undermining its new venture.88 Connecticut eventually entered into a 
gaming compact with the Tribe to secure its stake in the gaming 
enterprise.89  
B. Foxwoods Casino and Contemporary Economic and Cultural 
Development  
1. Foxwoods Casino 
The passage of the Indian Gaming Regulation Act (“IGRA”)90 in 1988 
marked the beginning of a new era of economic development for the 
Mashantucket Pequot and other similarly situated tribes. The Act paved the 
way for the Tribe’s gaming compact with the state, which, in turn, allowed 
for its expansion into Class III gaming. Class III gaming is defined by the 
IGRA as “all forms of gaming that are not [C]lass I gaming or [C]lass II 
gaming.”91 The gaming industry generally acknowledges that a Class III 
gaming license is required to operate a casino with the full array of gaming 
options. In the context of the Mashantucket Pequot, the Tribe needed the 
license to transform its bingo hall into a full-fledged gaming enterprise.92 
By 1987, the Pequot bingo enterprise was generating more than $10 million 
annually in gross sales with the Tribe netting $2.6 million.93 At the same 
time, the Tribe was successful in increasing its real estate holdings to more 
than 1600 acres.94 
As the Tribe’s on-reservation economy began to show signs of life, the 
initial goals set by Hayward — economic self-sufficiency and bringing 
members back to the reservation — took hold. The Tribe’s on-reservation 
population increased to more than 300 members.95   
                                                                                                                 
 88. Renee Ann Cramer, The Common Sense of Anti-Indian Racism: Reactions to 
Mashantucket Pequot Success in Gaming and Acknowledgement, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
313, 321 (citing California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987)). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Pub. L. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 
(2006)). 
 91. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8). 
 92. See Kathryn R. L. Rand, There Are No Pequots on the Plains: Assessing the Success 
of Indian Gaming, 5 Chap. L. Rev. 47, 50-53 (2002).   
 93. d’Hauteserre, supra note 76, at 116. 
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On February 15, 1992, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation 
welcomed the public to the Foxwoods Casino.96 The Casino was backed by 
a $60 million investment from a Malaysian enterprise that pioneered 
destination casino experiences. At a quarter of a million square feet, the 
casino became the largest gaming destination on the Eastern seaboard.97 It 
even dwarfed the largest Las Vegas Casino, the MGM Grand, by 75,000 
square feet.98 When its doors first opened, Foxwoods employed 2300 
workers.99 By 1996, that number had more than quadrupled to 11,300 
employees.100 Over the course of the next three decades, the Mashantucket 
Pequot Tribal Nation went from toeing the line of obsolescence to 
becoming one of the most significant economic presences in the region.   
2. The Cultural Impact 
The impact the Casino had on Pequot culture cannot be overstated. 
While the Tribe had become federally recognized and began exercising its 
sovereignty in the 1970s, the Casino was the true catalyst that brought 
members back to Mashantucket. The on-reservation population of the Tribe 
is higher today than it has been at any point since the establishment of the 
reservation.101 In addition to drawing members back to the reservation, the 
Casino’s revenue created an opportunity for the tribe to re-educate its 
members on the history and culture of the Tribe that has been largely lost. 
The clearest manifestation of this effort is the Mashantucket Pequot 
Museum and Research Center;102 however, the effort is by no means limited 
to the work at the research center or the museum exhibits. The difficult task 
of recovering a cultural identity lost to oppressive assimilation requires a 
multifaceted approach. 
In addition to the museum, the Tribe has either hosted or participated in a 
series of powwows in southern New England.103 The powwows are part of 
an effort to fuel the pan-Indian movement by bringing different tribal 
                                                                                                                 
 96. d’Hauteserre, supra note 76, at 116. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Sam Libby & Hilary Waldman, Family With Pequot Ties Finds Roots Run to Deep, 
HARTFORD COURANT (Aug. 28, 1995), http://articles.courant.com/1995-08-28/news/95082 
80013_1_tribe-mashantucket-pequots-foxwoods-resort-casino.   
 102. See BODINGER DE URIARTE, supra note 70, at 5.  
 103. See Ann McMullen, Soapbox Discourse: Tribal Historiography, Indian-White 
Relations, and Southeastern New England Powwows, PUB. HISTORIAN, Fall 1996, at 53, 56-
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cultures together to celebrate common ancestries and practices as well as 
display the distinct aspects of different tribes.104 The largest gathering at 
Mashantucket, the Green Corn Powwow, features dance contests, displays 
of traditional art, and an anthropological presentation of pre-contact 
culture.105   
When the Tribe’s population was driven off the reservation land, 
members scattered to all different parts of the country.106 Upon their return, 
few of these members had anything in common with on-reservation 
members, other than their ancestral lineage.107 The general public’s growing 
adverse sentiment toward the Tribe’s economic boom created a sense of 
urgency to educate its returning members of their common history and 
culture;108 unity was necessary.   
Historically, the Mashantucket Pequot and the surrounding communities 
have not enjoyed an amenable coexistence. This tension likely results from 
an adversarial relationship between the Tribe and its state overseers.109 The 
Tribe has never been reticent in challenging the actions of the colonial, 
state, and federal governments.110 When state and local officials 
consistently refused to aid the Tribe during its darkest hours, on-reservation 
members responded by treating those officials as trespassers when they 
came to enforce ordinances, state laws, or regulations. For example, the 
town of Ledyard continually refused to provide basic public services to the 
reservation. This prompted the few remaining members to remedy their 
situation through other forms of self-help.111 
                                                                                                                 
 104. McMullen, supra note 103, at 57.  
 105. For more details on the Green Corn Powwow, see MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL 
NATION, SCHEMITZUN: FEAST OF GREEN CORN & DANCE (2012) (promotional brochure), 
available at http://www.schemitzun.com/uploadedFiles/Brochure.pdf.  
 106. Lawlor, supra note 72, at 156. 
 107. Id. (“[Members] hailed from different parts of the country, from different social and 
political classes, and they still maintain a variety of political and religious orientations. In 
addition to being Pequot, they present a broad range of ethnic backgrounds.); see also Kirk 
Johnson, Tribe’s Promised Land Is Rich but Uneasy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 1995), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/20/nyregion/tribe-s-promised-land-is-rich-but-uneasy.html 
?pagewanted=all&src=pm.  
 108. See generally BODINGER DE URIARTE, supra note 70, for an in depth analysis of the 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe’s trials and efforts to cultivate a contemporary cultural identity, 
and the attempts made by outside groups to dictate the terms of tribal identity, often times 
for ulterior profit-driven motives.    
 109. Campisi, supra note 44, at 126-27. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 137-38.  
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol37/iss2/4
No. 2] UNION ORGANIZING AT FOXWOODS CASINO 529 
 
 
The tension between the state and the Tribe likely grew when the Tribe’s 
gaming enterprise became successful. When the Mashantucket Pequot fled 
the reservation, and moved to different parts of the nation, they returned 
with a plethora of ethnic, socio-economic, political, and religious 
backgrounds. The public then viewed the returning tribal members as 
insufficiently “Indian” to legitimately take advantage of the IGRA or 
invoke tribal sovereignty.112 Furthermore, the returning members had 
diminished knowledge of Mashantucket Pequot culture and history. Thus, 
the only public symbol of community and tribal unification was the Casino. 
In response to the public sentiment as well as the Tribe’s cultural 
survival, the tribal government devoted a significant portion of its 
newfound wealth to building the Mashantucket Pequot Museum and 
Research Center113 as well as funding initiatives to re-connect with Pequot 
culture and encourage community involvement among tribal members. The 
wealth generated by Foxwoods Casino has, thus, played an intricate role in 
reviving Mashantucket Pequot culture. Indeed, the very survival of the 
Tribe is largely attributable to the success of the Tribe’s gaming enterprise.  
3. The Current Financial Uncertainty of the Mashantucket Pequot 
Gaming Enterprise 
The old English adage “all good things come to an end” rang true in 
2007 when the U.S. housing market slumped. In 2006, the Tribe began 
construction on the MGM Grand Tower, an ambitious endeavor for any 
business enterprise.114 The Tribe — like most other developers across the 
country — found itself buying into the hype that bubble markets do not 
burst. Rodney Butler, the current Chairman of the Mashantucket Pequot 
Tribal Council, reminisced, 
Every consultant, every analyst and every banker on the planet 
encouraged us to keep getting bigger. . . . If it wasn’t for that, I’d 
say, Jeez, maybe we’re just idiots. But these were smart people. 
Then we opened the doors at the MGM Grand, and five months 
later, Lehman crashes and the world falls apart.115 
The completion of the MGM Tower was the moment that finally 
launched the Tribe into its current financial tailspin.116 The Casino’s 
                                                                                                                 
 112. See Cramer, supra note 88, at 325-27. 
 113. The price tag of the impressive museum is over $200 million. 
 114. Sokolove, supra note 3. 
 115. Id.  
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financial crisis forced the Tribe to implement austerity measures. It was in 
this context of financial uncertainty that the UAW organizing campaign 
commenced.  
IV. The United Auto Workers Organizing Campaign at Foxwoods 
Table game dealers at Foxwoods Casino began collaborating with the 
UAW and in July of 2007 the union initiated a signature campaign with 
casino table dealers in a bid to organize the three thousand workers.117 The 
faltering economy and the Tribe’s precarious financial position spread 
uncertainty and fear among the non-member employees.118  Employees 
were particularly concerned that the new austerity measures would drive 
members to take the tip-lucrative dealer jobs in the Casino. The 
Mashantucket Pequot Native-employee-preference law only exacerbated 
those concerns. 
In September of 2007, the UAW petitioned the NLRB on behalf of the 
dealers to certify them as a collective bargaining unit and force an election 
at Foxwoods.119 Union officials claimed that the signature campaign started 
that summer had culminated in supermajority support.120 The Casino took a 
public stance opposing the unionization of the workers. 
By the time the UAW filed its petition with the NLRB, the Mashantucket 
Pequot had its own labor law in the tribal statutes. The Mashantucket 
Pequot Labor Relations Law (“MPLRL”) was enacted in August of 2007, 
mere months before the NLRB ruled on the UAW petition.121 In its initial 
form, the MPLRL borrowed modestly from the National Labor Relations 
Act (“NLRA”) with similar protective mechanisms for both workers and 
the employer; however, it contained several punitive measures targeted at 
employees.122 These measures included levying attorney’s fees against 
                                                                                                                 
 117. John Christoffersen, UAW Files Petition for Union at Foxwoods Casino, USA 
TODAY (Sept. 28, 2007, 12:03 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/2007-09-
28-foxwoods-uaw_N.htm. 
 118. Only about one-third of one percent of the Casino workforce consists of tribal 
members. Foxwoods Resort Casino, No. 34-RC-2230, 2007 N.L.R.B. Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 
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employees who advanced “frivolous lawsuits” and withdrawal of union 
recognition for employees that committed prohibited practices.123  
Additionally, the dispute resolution mechanism raised the question of 
whether the Tribe could be an impartial adjudicator when labor disputes 
arose.124 Perhaps, most importantly, the 2007 statute prohibited union 
security agreements and an additional right-to-work statute freed employees 
from the obligation of paying union dues, regardless of representation.125 
The 2007 law’s purpose was to “provide tribal employees the right to 
organize and bargain collectively with their employers, to promote 
harmonious and cooperative relationships between the Tribe as an employer 
and tribal employee, and to promote the health, safety, political integrity 
and economic security of the tribe.”126 Union organizers were not 
convinced. 
The MPLRL was passed partly in response to the D.C. District Court of 
Appeals holding in San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB.127 With 
the blessing of D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the NLRB declared its 
jurisdictional reach to regulate labor issues on reservations.128 Prior to the 
San Manuel decision, the Supreme Court mandated in Federal Power 
Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation that “statutes of ‘general 
jurisdiction’ apply to conduct and operation, not only of individual Indians, 
but also of Indian tribes.”129 That holding was, however, tempered by the 
interpretive canon also adopted by the Supreme Court that “(1) ambiguities 
in a federal statute must be resolved in favor of Indians, and (2) a clear 
expression of Congressional intent is necessary before a court may construe 
a federal statute so as to impair tribal sovereignty.”130 
The Board’s reasoning differed somewhat from that of the Court of 
Appeals. The NLRB endorsed the Tuscarora application of federal law, 
provided that Congress did not have a clear intention otherwise; but it also 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Id. at *16-*17. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See 28 MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS §§ 1-5 (Supp. 2007), available at 
http://www.mptnlaw.com/laws/2007%20Supplement.pdf; 32 MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT 
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adopted three exceptions to this general application, which was first 
introduced by the Ninth Circuit:  
(1) the law touches exclusive rights of self-governance in purely 
intramural matters; (2) the application of the law to the tribe 
would abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties; or (3) there 
is proof by legislative history or some other means that Congress 
intended [the law] not to apply to Indians on their 
reservations . . . .”131  
In making its determination, the Board found that none of the three 
Coeur d’Alene exceptions applied to on-reservation casino operations.132 
The decision effectively overturned thirty years of Board precedent that 
treated on-reservation tribal enterprises as arms of their respective tribal 
governments outside the NLRB’s jurisdictional reach.133 
 The Court of Appeals departed completely from the Tuscarora-Coeur 
d’Alene analysis, instead applying its own test to determine whether federal 
labor law should extend to on-reservation activity.134 It determined that the 
“operation of a casino is not a traditional attribute of self-government,” and 
concluded that the NLRA’s jurisdictional reach would have a negligible 
impact on tribal sovereignty and did not warrant “a need to construe the 
statute narrowly against application to employment at the Casino.”135  
Publicly, the Mashantucket Pequot seemed unconcerned by any lasting 
effects the San Manuel decision might have on its authority to pass and 
regulate employment and labor laws. The Tribe’s general counsel Jackson 
King told the New York Times (after the board decision but before the 
appeal) that he believed the decision would be challenged in court and that 
the Tribe would “continue to focus on keeping [its] employees satisfied and 
happy and make sure their benefits are in line, and hopefully get to the 
point where they wouldn’t seek representation.”136 Unfortunately, the 
Tribe’s dire financial situation following the MGM Grand Tower project 
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became the Tribe’s focus at the cost of many benefits that King had hoped 
would pacify employees. 
When employees at Foxwoods began showing signs of interest in 
organizing to collectively bargain in 2006, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal 
Council found it necessary to pass its own labor statute. The “Findings” 
section of the statute broadcasted the Tribal Council’s view on the San 
Manuel decision: 
Given its inherent authority over employment and labor relations 
on the Reservation, the tribal regulation of employment on the 
Reservation, and the longstanding federal policy protecting tribal 
self-government and promoting tribal self-sufficiency, the Tribe 
finds that the NLRA does not apply to the tribal government as 
an employer. Application of the NLRA to the tribal government 
as an employer would substantially impair the ability of the 
Tribe to exercise its sovereign authority, including undermining 
tribal employment laws, subjecting the tribal government to the 
threat of strikes, and disrupting the tribal government's ability to 
provide essential services to the community.137 
In effect, the Tribe codified its belief that the NLRA does not apply to 
tribal government enterprises, and insisted that, regardless of what federal 
courts may say, the Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise (“MPGE”) 
was an “arm of the tribal government” — and thus outside the jurisdictional 
reach of the NLRB.138  
The UAW, on behalf of the Foxwoods dealers, initially ignored tribal 
law and instead petitioned the NLRB.139 Because no union has ever sought 
to organize under tribal law, it is safe to assume that the UAW’s hesitance 
to do so was a strategic decision to litigate the issue in a familiar forum. 
Additionally, the punitive measures directed at employees and union 
                                                                                                                 
 137. 32 MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS ch. 1 § 2(g) (2008), available at http:// 
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representatives in the 2007 MPLRL made the tribal system a less favorable 
forum to litigate the issue, if litigation became necessary.140 
The issue of a labor strike, an economic action sanctioned under the 
NLRA, also weighed heavily on the Tribe. In the initial NLRB petition 
decision, the NLRB rejected the tribal counsel’s argument that strikes 
constituted a direct threat or effect on the political integrity or economic 
security of the Tribe.141 In Montana v. United States, the Supreme Court 
held that tribal civil jurisdiction did not generally extend to regulation of 
non-members. The Court did, however, specify two exceptions to this 
limiting rule: where “the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual 
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, 
contracts, leases, or other arrangements” or where “the conduct of non-
Indians on fee lands within its reservation . . . conduct threatens or has 
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the 
health or welfare of the tribe.”142   The Board distinguished the consensual 
commercial relationship143 — described in Montana — from the 
employment relationship issues in this case finding it inapplicable.144 It also 
held that the Montana “political integrity” exception did not apply to 
organizing campaign at Foxwoods, taking a moment to voice its full-
throated skepticism of the Tribe’s economic concerns: 
 I find particularly unpersuasive the Employer's claim, 
unsupported by record evidence, that "a strike against the Tribal 
Gaming Enterprise would severely disrupt the Tribe's continuing 
ability to provide essential services" to its constituent members. 
As previously indicated, the Employer has annual gross revenues 
in excess of $ 1 billion, and approximately 98% of the Tribe's 
                                                                                                                 
 140. See 32 MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS ch. 1 §§ 5-10. 
 141. Foxwoods Resort Casino, No. 34-RC-2230, 2007 N.L.R.B. Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 
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revenues are derived from the operation of Foxwoods. Thus, 
approximately 2 percent of the Tribe's annual income, at least $ 
20,000,000, is derived from outside sources. The record does not 
indicate the Tribe's capital reserves, or the amounts needed to 
fund any of its essential services. Therefore, even if the 
Employer were to face a protracted strike, there is no evidence 
that it would have insufficient revenues and/or capital to provide 
the Tribe's 900 members with any essential public service.145 
The Board certified the Foxwoods dealers as a bargaining unit and 
ordered a secret ballot election.146 In November of that year, the bargaining 
unit voted for the UAW to represent them to Foxwoods.147  
Following the Board’s initial decision favoring the UAW’s petition on 
behalf of the Foxwoods dealers, various unions sought to capitalize on 
Board precedent. In April of 2008, the International Union of Operating 
Engineers successfully petitioned to force an election for 310 engineering 
and support employees.148 The next month, the UAW petitioned the NLRB 
to recognize thirty-eight Racebook writers as another bargaining unit.149  In 
2010, the UAW petitioned the United Food and Commercial Workers 
Union on behalf of servers and bartenders.150 In each case, the 
Mashantucket Pequot had an increased sense of urgency to escape the 
jurisdictional reach of the NLRB.  
In the April 2008 petition, the Tribe made essentially the same 
arguments it did in opposition to the initial UAW petition in 2007; 
however, this time, it expanded on its financial concerns.151 The Tribe 
attempted to clarify its precarious financial position in the event of a strike 
by submitting evidence of its unusual debt structure. The Board again 
dismissed the economic claim as “particularly unpersuasive.”152 It stated 
that there was “insufficient evidence to establish that [the Tribe] would lack 
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sufficient revenues and/or capital to provide [its] 900 members, as well as 
employees . . . with any ‘essential’ public services” in the event of a 
strike.153 Again the UAW petitioned in May 2008, this time on behalf of a 
small group of Racebook writers, and again the Board certified the 
bargaining unit making a finding identical to the April petition.154  
While the Board continued to certify petitions to establish bargaining 
units and order elections, the Tribe held on tightly to the belief that the 
NLRB did not have jurisdiction over it; or, in the alternative, that the Board 
should decline jurisdiction as a matter of discretion because exercising 
jurisdiction would significantly infringe on the Tribe’s sovereignty.155 In 
September of 2008, the UAW filed another petition, this time alleging that 
the Tribe committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the 
newly certified dealers bargaining unit.156 The Board again rejected the 
Tribe’s argument, ordering Foxwoods to bargain with the local union.157  
Soon after the Board’s order, the UAW and Foxwoods announced in a 
joint statement that both sides would consider bargaining under the 
Mashantucket Pequot labor law.158 Around the same time of the 
announcement, the Tribe amended its Right to Work and Labor statutes to 
make an exception to union security agreements made between bargaining 
units certified under tribal law and tribal employers.159 The amended statute 
retained many of the standard protections found in the NLRA and also 
addressed concerns union organizers and employees had about the Tribal 
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 159. Compare 28 MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS § 3 (Supp. 2007), available at 
http://www.mptnlaw.com/laws/2007%20Supplement.pdf, with 28 MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT 
TRIBAL LAWS § 3 (Supp. 2010-11), available at http://www.mptnlaw.com/laws/2010-2011% 
20Pocket%20Part%20to%202008%20Tribal%20Laws.pdf; see also 32 MASHANTUCKET 
PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS ch. 1 § 9(c) (Supp. 2010-11).  
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Court’s ability to remain impartial in labor disputes.160 It did, however, 
retain the no-strike/no-lockout provision, a distinct departure from the 
NLRA.161 In this way, the end product resembled most state labor laws 
governing public sector collective bargaining. Unfortunately, days before 
the joint statement was released, the MPGE announced that Foxwoods and 
the MGM Grand would need to lay off 700 workers.162 
In 2010, the UAW and the Mashantucket Pequot announced that the two 
parties had brokered the first union contract under tribal law. The parties 
found common ground by agreeing to negotiate and operate under tribal 
labor law while retaining their respective right to seek redress in federal 
court.163 The contract gave both the union and Foxwoods reason to claim 
victory. The unionized employees received, among other things, a 12% 
raise over two years, a new tip distribution system over which workers had 
more control, and more job security.164 Perhaps more importantly, the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) established what the union 
viewed as a more neutral dispute resolution mechanism by giving the 
enforcement of the CBA to a panel of neutral arbitrators as opposed to a 
Tribe-appointed special master.165 The MPGE did not walk away empty 
handed either. The contract provided for cost controls in the form of 
flexible staffing decisions166 “at a time when gaming [had] been hard hit by 
                                                                                                                 
 160. 32 MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS ch. 1 § 7 (Supp. 2010-11). Specifically, 
the amended statute prescribed a more detailed dispute resolution mechanism that allowed 
for both the Tribal employer and union to appoint arbitrators with a third impartial arbitrator 
appointed by the other two arbitrators. 
 161. Id. at ch. 1 § 11.  
 162. Id.  
 163. Harriet Jones, UAW Brokers First Union Contract Under Tribal Law, NPR (Mar. 
14, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124625523. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the Mashantucket Pequot Gaming 
Enterprise, An Arm of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation and International Union, 
U.A.W., AFL-CIO, art. 26 (Jan. 29, 2010 through Dec. 31, 2011) [hereinafter CBA], 
available at http://uawatmohegan.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Foxwoods-Contract_Fin 
al-proof.pdf. The CBA also limits the arbitrator’s ability to interpret tribal law: 
An Arbitrator does not have the authority and shall not interpret Mashantucket 
Pequot Tribal law. In the event that a question concerning the interpretation of 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribal law arises during the Arbitration proceedings, the 
parties may jointly request that the Arbitrator make application to the 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Court for advice on any question of Mashantucket 
Pequot Tribal Law. 
Id. art. 26.05(f).  
 166. Id. art. 13. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
538 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
 
 
the recession.”167 In addition, the contract addressed the Tribe’s major 
concern over workforce dissonance and strikes.168 
But the greatest achievement from the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe’s 
perspective was the protection of its sovereign right to regulate labor. The 
media and tribal law experts touted the CBA as a deal that respected the 
sovereignty of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe.169 Julie Kushner, who was 
the assistant regional director for the UAW at the time, described to the 
Hartford Courant newspaper that “[w]hat we have done under this 
agreement is show that the inherent rights of the employee are not in 
conflict with the sovereignty of the tribe.”170  
V. A Successful Campaign, but a Lost Opportunity 
The historical contours of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe have shaped it 
into what it is today, and inform its modern decision-making process. The 
UAW labor campaign is particularly illustrative of the values the Tribe 
holds sacrosanct. Campisi’s description of the Tribe, “tenacious persistence 
to maintain the tribal identity and an unswerving struggle to hold on to 
tribal land” ring true in this employment context.171 The Tribe was not 
facing a literal threat to its land holdings or cultural continuity, but rather, a 
threat to Foxwoods Casino — the source of its financial and cultural 
renewal. 
The Mashantucket Pequot’s tumultuous history, particularly with local 
and federal government authorities, has likely instilled a fundamental 
distrust in federal and state agencies. Additionally, the historically 
antagonistic relationship the Tribe had with the surrounding community 
undoubtedly motivated the Tribe to initially resist the non-member 
employees’ attempts to bargain collectively with the MPGE.172  It is, thus, a 
                                                                                                                 
 167. Jones, supra note 163. 
 168. See 32 MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS ch. 1 § 11 (2008), available at http:// 
www.mptnlaw.com/laws/Titles%2024%20-%20End.pdf. 
 169. See, e.g. Eric Gershon, Foxwoods, UAW Agree on Contract for Table-Game 
Dealers, HARTFORD COURANT (Jan. 27, 2010), http://articles.courant.com/2010-01-27/busin 
ess/hc-foxwoods-union.artjan27_1_contract-for-table-game-dealers-mashantucket-pequot-tri 
be-tribal-law; Jones, supra note 163; Daniel Schwartz, Breaking News: UAW/Foxwoods – 
“Historic Agreement” Reached to Negotiate Contract Under Tribal Law, CONN. EMP. L. 
BLOG (Oct. 31, 2008), http://www.ctemploymentlawblog.com/2008/10/articles/breaking-
news-uawfoxwoods-historic-agreement-reached-to-negotiate-contract-under-tribal-law/. 
 170. Gershon, supra note 169. 
 171. Campisi, supra note 44, at 117.  
 172. The Mohegans, an offshoot of the original pre-colonial Pequot tribe, maintained a 
more amicable relationship with the surrounding communities, largely as a result of its 
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reasonable expectation that the Mashantucket Pequot would resist both 
NLRB jurisdiction as well as an organizing campaign of non-members on 
the reservation. This is certainly exacerbated by the fact that the 
jurisdictional reach of the NLRB and the organizing campaign implicated 
the Tribe’s economic livelihood. 
A. The NLRB Reaction to the Foxwoods Organizing Campaign  
The NLRB’s 2007 order invokes memories of Connecticut’s Department 
of Welfare in the early and mid-twentieth century. At the time, the Tribe 
suffered from severe economic depression, and its pleas for any sort of 
government aid fell on deaf ears.173 Instead, the primary government 
response came from the Department of Welfare’s rigid enforcement of 
zoning and welfare regulations that the Tribe could not overcome because 
of its dire economic state.174 The Department of Welfare’s narrow focus on 
social welfare, while disregarding the Tribe’s cultural welfare, bears a 
striking resemblance to the stance of the NLRB and subsequent federal 
court decisions. The NLRB’s decision for the UAW Foxwoods organizing 
case reflects a similarly narrow view of the various issues that should be 
considered when exercising federal or state jurisdiction over Foxwoods. Its 
glib dismissal of the Tribe’s economic concerns demonstrates its 
fundamental misunderstanding of the critical role that Foxwoods played in 
the Tribe’s survival, and a fundamental misapplication of the economic 
security exception in Montana. Surely, a fuller understanding of the Tribe’s 
tragic history and its past existence at the brink of extinction warrants a 
closer analysis than “they can afford it.” 
Additionally, the NLRB’s analysis in San Manuel and the subsequent 
case law has sculpted a labor debate that reflects a general policy of placing 
limitations on tribal sovereignty based on the “Indian-ness” of the act or 
                                                                                                                 
historic alliance with English colonists (even during the Pequot war with the English). See 
DE FOREST, supra note 12, at 59. Today, the communities surrounding the Mohegan Sun 
Casino enjoy a financial community agreement with the Mohegan tribe, whereas the 
communities surrounding Foxwoods do not enjoy such an agreement. See generally Kevin 
Ryan, Municipal and State Impact of Gaming, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 553 (2002-2003).   
 173. The Mashantucket Pequot Museum offers an engaging and heartfelt account of the 
tumultuous years that nearly saw the extinction of the Mashantucket Pequot reservation 
community in the exhibit Life on the Reservation. The exhibit offers a more complete view 
of the trials and tribulations the tribe struggled through to survive years of racism and 
exploitation. For more information, see MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT MUSEUM & RESEARCH 
CENTER, http://www.pequotmuseum.org (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).  
 174. Bee, supra note 68, at 196.  
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industry in question. Using coded language such as “purely intramural,”175 
the NLRB and federal courts determined that only issues such as tribal 
membership, inheritance rules, and domestic relations are securely in the 
fold of a tribe’s exclusive jurisdiction.176 All of these categories are subject 
to the unique cultural characteristics that vary from tribe to tribe, and thus, 
are distinctly Hopi or Pequot or Cherokee. Activities distinctly “Indian,” 
however, do not enjoy the same level of deference to tribal jurisdiction. For 
example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals espoused — and the NLRB 
endorsed — the view that owning and managing a casino is “a typical 
commercial enterprise, operating, and substantially affecting, interstate 
commerce.”177 Thus, it is ironic that the single most important issue for 
almost every tribe’s survival in a free market economy — economic 
growth — is one of the least jurisdictionally sacrosanct in the eyes of the 
NLRB and federal courts. 
In 2011, on the heels of the successful UAW negotiations, the Tribe 
petitioned the NLRB, objecting to the results of the July 2010 election for 
United Food and Commercial Workers Union (“UFCWU”) 
representation.178 It alleged that the election was tainted by racial rhetoric 
intended to “create or inflame racial prejudice among the voters in the 
election.”179 Statements such as “[t]ribal stipends are ending Jan. 1st, 2011. 
Where do you think they are going to look for jobs . . . Walmart, Home 
Depot . . . I think not,” were included as evidence of the racial animus that 
plagued the election.180 The Tribe appealed an unfavorable ruling by an 
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) to the NLRB, claiming that the judge 
should have required the Union to prove the veracity of the claims made in 
                                                                                                                 
 175. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 176. Foxwoods Resort Casino, No. 34-RC-2230, 2007 N.L.R.B. Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 
285, at *19 (Oct. 24, 2007). 
 177. Id.  
 178. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., No. 34-RC-2392, 2011 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 103 
(Mar. 17, 2011).  
 179. Id. at *3. 
 180. Id. at *3 n.3. Other statements included: 
 [E]very one of our jobs are on the line. They will come to work here and are 
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checks and [our] jobs are up for grabs. 
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what it alleged to be racial comments.181 The NLRB rejected this claim 
stating that the comments lacked inflammatory content sufficient to 
substantiate a prima facie case of racial rhetoric, in which case the 
respondent would have to respond by proving the veracity of the 
comments.182 Because the issues that the comments implicated were of 
legitimate concern to workers, there was no evidence of intent to induce 
racial tensions. The NLRB upheld the election results and certified the 
bargaining unit over the protests of the Tribe.183  
The Tribe’s ability to regulate labor campaigns is of particular 
importance because of the adversarial nature of the campaign, which pitted 
non-member employees against tribal enterprises. An organizing campaign 
is inherently different in the context of tribal enterprises than the more 
traditional campaigns. An element of “otherness” seeps into the organizing 
campaigns on tribal reservations, often for the strategic purpose of 
garnering support against the tribal employer. While the rhetoric may not 
have been racial as the Tribe alleged, the member/non-member dichotomy 
was still apparent in the Foxwoods campaigns.  
The UFCWU decision illustrates the unique character of an organizing 
campaign on a tribal reservation. This is particularly true at Mashantucket 
where tribal employment law includes a preference for tribal members.184 A 
typical organizing campaign is inherently a struggle between the laborer 
and the capitalist. The campaigns are usually purely economic or, in other 
cases, representative of a class struggle with cultural subtexts. Regardless, 
the typical campaign is an act of solidarity between workers to leverage a 
more substantial bargaining position against a historically exploitative 
employer class.  
An on-reservation campaign with the rhetoric of the UFCWU election 
paints a very different picture. Campaign rhetoric is less a reflection of 
labor/management disputes, and more a reflection of non-member/tribal 
member tensions. Indeed, in one statement published in the NLRB opinion 
rejecting the Tribe’s petition, a pro-union leaflet stated that it was not that 
“management has their hands tied; the Tribe makes the call. . . . All they are 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Id. at *5. NLRB precedent states that the burden shifts to the party “making use of a 
racial message to establish that it was useful and germane.” Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 
66, 72 (1962).  
 182. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 2011 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 103, at *3. 
 183. Id. 
 184. 33 MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS ch. 1 §§ 1-13 (Supp. 2012), available at 
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concerned about is THEIR money and lifestyles . . . not OURS!”185 
Statements such as these reinforce the notion that on-reservation labor 
campaigns are not typical organizing campaigns. The historic tragedies of 
tribes, which include both physical and cultural genocide,186 are byproducts, 
albeit extreme ones, informing this modern adversarial relationship.  
Given the tense undercurrents that manifest in on-reservation organizing 
campaigns, exemplified in the UFCWU campaign at Foxwoods, one 
wonders whether the purpose of the National Labor Relations Act  is best 
effectuated by extending its jurisdictional reach to tribal enterprises with 
such little regard for these unique, historical complexities. Deferring to 
tribal labor law — when available — offers one solution to the “member 
versus non-member” adversarial relationship. If the NLRB refrains from 
exercising its jurisdiction in situations where there is a viable tribal labor 
statute, and the tribe is not actively engaging in unfair labor practices, non-
members could organize under tribal law, and enforce their rights under the 
same.187 If the protector of employee rights were also the tribe, non-member 
workers would likely view their organizing efforts as against the employing 
enterprise, rather than the particular tribe. If federal jurisprudence 
encouraged these roles rather than those whereby the tribes are pitted 
against non-member workforces, it could shift the paradigm of on-
reservation labor campaigns away from the racial and restore the traditional 
labor/management dichotomy. 
The NLRB’s decisions throughout the UAW organizing campaign and 
beyond seem to reflect an uninformed consideration of the unique 
circumstances surrounding Foxwoods and the Mashantucket Pequot’s 
reliance on Foxwoods for the Tribe’s survival. The threat of NLRB 
jurisdiction over tribal enterprises, however, was absolutely crucial to the 
                                                                                                                 
 185. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 2011 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 103, at *15. 
 186. For a lively and sophisticated debate on the technicalities surrounding the 
application of the term “genocide” to the Pequot experience, compare Steven T. Katz, The 
Pequot War Reconsidered, 64 NEW ENG. Q. 206 (1991), with Freeman, supra note 12, at 
285. 
 187. As noted previously, the Foxwoods Casino and the UAW eventually agreed to 
bargain under tribal law. The negotiations were a success, and lead to a first contract in 
2010. At the time of this article, Foxwoods and the UAW were approaching the end of year 
long arbitration  in the hopes of re-negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement despite 
continuing economic hardships. See Brian Hallenback, Foxwoods, Union Dealers Headed to 
Arbitration, THEDAY.COM (Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.theday.com/article/20120403/BIZ02/ 
304039940/1044 and Brian Hallenback, Foxwoods Seeking to Cut 50 Dealers’ Jobs, 
THEDAY.COM (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.theday.com/article/20130313/BIZ02/303139929/ 
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perceived success of the union organizing effort and an outcome respecting 
tribal sovereignty. It is unclear whether the NLRB had ulterior motives, but 
what is clear is that the looming fear of NLRB jurisdiction was an essential 
bargaining tool for the union organizers and supporters. Without it, the 
rather draconian labor statute that preceded the 2008 amended statute would 
likely have prevented any meaningful negotiations under tribal law. 
B. The Union Strategy at Foxwoods  
To the credit of the tactical prowess of the union officials and 
representatives in talks with the Tribe, the UAW strategy throughout the 
organizing campaign was to capitalize on the Tribe’s resistance to federal 
jurisdiction. The organizing and negotiating strategy of the UAW reflected 
a broader understanding of how the Tribe would react to an organizing 
campaign at Foxwoods. While the NLRB was satisfied to scapegoat the San 
Manuel decision, the UAW recognized that collective bargaining need not 
exist solely in the context of federal law.  
The first indications of organizing surfaced as far back as 1998.188 The 
organizing movement did not gain traction at Foxwoods until 2006, 
following the San Manuel decision, when casino employees realized the 
financial woes of the Tribe threatened job security and benefits.189 The goal 
of any organizing campaign is to establish majority support of a specified 
bargaining unit for union representation. When the UAW turned its 
attention to the plight of the Foxwoods table game dealers, workers were 
discontent with wages, working conditions, and the inevitable threat to 
employee benefits that every sector in the country faces during a 
recession.190 Thus, a campaign was ripe for success. 
Around the time the organizing campaign had reached the height of its 
activity among employees at Foxwoods, dealers’ starting pay was $4.50 per 
hour, with the bulk of their income coming from table tips.191 According to 
an UAW informational flyer, the rate was less than half of starting pay for 
dealers represented by the union in Detroit.192  In addition to wages, table 
game dealers had a number of grievances, including issues with their 
benefits packages, working conditions, and the ratio of full-time to part-
                                                                                                                 
 188. See Gershon, supra note 169.  
 189. Jones, supra note 163. 
 190. Id.  
 191. Christoffersen, supra note 117. 
 192. See “Because We’re Worth It!”, UAW LOCAL 2121 (Sept. 18, 2008) (flyer), 
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time employees.193 Workplace safety also occupied a significant portion of 
the campaign debate. Pro-union workers argued that the Tribe had not acted 
in the employee’s best interests to address second-hand smoke in the 
Casino.194  
The union organizing strategy at Foxwoods is best characterized as the 
dual threat of economic instability and erosion to tribal sovereignty. The 
classic economic tools deployed during an organizing campaign are 
picketing and striking. Under the NLRA, and the case law that has 
developed following the passage of the Wagner Act, employees involved in 
an organizing campaign have limited protections when utilizing these 
tools.195 While picketing indeed played a public role in the UAW 
organizing campaign,196 strikes were not utilized because such activity 
would have threatened the Mashantucket Pequot’s tribal sovereignty — 
infringing on its ability to govern its economic development unfettered by 
federal law and regulation. The issue of sovereignty was, without question, 
the most significant and effective bargaining tool used by the UAW and 
organizing members.  
Union organizers approached the table game dealers at Foxwoods a mere 
month after the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision in San Manuel.197 By the next 
year, the organizing members had alleged at least three charges of unfair 
labor practices against the Tribe, including attempts to bribe employees to 
abandon the organizing campaign.198 Unfair labor practice (“ULP”) charges 
are generally an ineffective tool for altering a participant’s behavior, as the 
NLRB and General Council resolve most ULPs long after the conclusion of 
                                                                                                                 
 193. UAW Files Petition for Union at Foxwoods Casino, UAW LOCAL 2121 — OUR 
HISTORY (Sept. 28, 2007), http://region9a.uaw.org/local2121/index.cfm?action=cat&categor 
yID=c25afcec-18f2-47ee-85fb-414111121c84. 
 194. At the time, it was ambiguous whether Connecticut State had the jurisdictional 
authority to regulate tobacco smoke and usage through its gaming compact with the 
Mashantucket Pequot and Mohegan Tribes. See Mark Pazinokas, State Weighs Ban on 
Casino Smoking, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/26/nyregio 
n/connecticut/26polct.html.  
 195. For example, the Supreme Court held that the NLRA protected workers who staged 
a walkout in protest of unsafe working conditions. NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 
9 (1962). 
 196. See Michael Gannon, UAW Vows Foxwoods Protests Will Go On, 
NORWICHBULLETIN.COM (May 14, 2008, 1:24 AM), http://www.norwichbulletin.com/news/x 
1191419401/UAW-vows-Foxwood-protests-will-go-on#axzz1ugSWjacH.  
 197. Foxwoods, MASSCHUSSETTS AFL-CIO, http://www.massaflcio.org/foxwoods (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2013). 
 198. Id. The NLRA prohibits employers from using promises of benefit to coerce 
individual employees from organizing. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (c) (2006). 
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the organizing campaign or parties reach settlement.  Therefore ULP 
charges were not a deterrent to invoking NLRB jurisdiction. Instead, UAW 
officials waited until they could show a flood of support among the 
potential members of the table game bargaining unit to petition the NLRB. 
Under section 159 of the Act, labor organizations are able to petition the 
NLRB to force an election if they allege that a “substantial number of 
employees . . . wish to be represented for collective bargaining . . . .”199 The 
petition, filed in 2007, asked the NLRB to interject and coordinate an 
election. More importantly, section 159 of the Act required the Board to 
make a ruling on whether it had jurisdiction over on-reservation labor 
issues, an appeal of which would likely be sustained by a federal court.200 
The threat of a court ruling on NLRB jurisdiction over union organizing 
and regulation on the reservation was a significant bargaining tool that 
could only be effective once, thus it would have been crucial to avoid an 
appeal in federal court unless absolutely necessary. Shortly after the NLRB 
ordered a secret ballot election, employees were elected by a significant 
majority to be represented by the UAW.201   
With every milestone throughout the organizing campaign it became 
more evident that while the Tribe denied the NLRB’s jurisdictional 
reach,202 it was more concerned with avoiding an appeal to federal courts 
where judicial recognition of the NLRB’s jurisdiction over Foxwoods 
would be all but certain.203 In the year following the election, the Tribe 
refused to bargain with the newly established UAW Local 2121, arguing 
that the election was fraught with indiscretion.204 After seven days of 
hearings, the administrative law judge rejected the Tribe’s petition and 
certified the election.205 Despite the certification, the Tribe continued to 
                                                                                                                 
 199. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (c)(1)(A). 
 200. See infra note 238 and accompanying text. 
 201. Connecticut: Casino Dealers Vote to Unionize, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/26/nyregion/26mbrfs-FOXWOODS.html?fta=y.  
 202. See infra Part IV. 
 203. While the Tribe faced the possibility of an appeal within the Second and D.C. 
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federal agencies. In the Second Circuit, the court of appeals in Reich v. Mashantucket Sand 
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federal statutes — in this case, the Occupational Safety and Health Act — applied to on-
reservations ventures. The holding all but guaranteed a similar conclusion of the matter of 
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 204. See Foxwoods Resort Casino, N.L.R.B. Case No. 34-RC-2230 (Mar. 11, 2008), 
available at http://www.ctemploymentlawblog.com/foxwoodsalj.pdf. 
 205. Id.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
546 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
 
 
refuse to bargain with the Union. Spectators assumed the Tribe’s refusal to 
bargain evidenced its intention to appeal the election certification to the 
federal appeals court.206 Indeed, following the certification of the election, 
the tribe announced its intention to “appeal all aspects of the case” to the 
appeals court.207 In another statement, however, general counsel for the 
Tribe reiterated that “[t]he union could already have a contract by now if 
they had followed tribal law.”208 The Tribe continued to publicly declare its 
intention to appeal the case; however, when the time came to put words into 
action, the results reflected the reality of the Tribe’s position.  
On October 11, 2008, a mere eight days after the NLRB declared that the 
Tribe must bargain with the Foxwoods local, both the Union and Casino 
announced that negotiations would be conducted under tribal law.209 On the 
surface, this announcement appeared to be a victory for the Mashantucket 
Pequot; but a closer examination reveals the mutual benefits for the Union 
as well. The Union won a key strategic victory by not only forcing the 
MPGE to recognize it as the bargaining representative, but also by inducing 
the Tribe to address concerns the Union had with the objectivity of a tribal 
dispute resolution.210  Additionally, both sides retained the right to enforce 
their rights in federal court should the situation warrant it.211  
The 2008 agreement to negotiate under tribal law resulted in one of the 
first collective bargaining agreements of its kind. As noted above, the 
agreement sidestepped concerns of objectivity in the dispute resolution 
process by creating an alternative dispute resolution process that 
incorporated a neutral arbitration, rather than involving a tribe-appointed 
officer or the tribal court system.212  Perhaps more importantly for the 
                                                                                                                 
 206. Election certifications themselves are not considered final judgments for the 
purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act, and thus are not appealable. It is common 
practice for employers to refuse to bargain after an election and certification to open a 
pathway to appeal in federal court. See American Federation of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 
401, 404-07 (1940).  
 207. Mashantuckets Again Defy Ruling, Set Sights on U.S. Court of Appeals, UAW 
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 208. Id.  
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 210. CBA, supra note 165, art. 26. All grievances that were not settled would be 
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 211. Id. at Side Letter/Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Governing Law. 
 212. Id. art. 26. 
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Union, the CBA included a side letter that addressed the “governing law” 
clause. The letter, a memorandum of understanding, declared that the CBA 
or any other agreement does not constitute a “waiver of any right the union 
may claim to have to pursue other remedies.”213 The letter goes on to 
reiterate the Mashantucket Pequot’s stance — that the Board has no 
jurisdiction over its casino. It declared that by agreeing to the Union’s 
memorandum of understanding, the Tribe did not acknowledge that any 
additional remedies existed outside Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Law.214 
The success of the union organizing campaign is attributable to the 
organizers ability to shift the Tribe’s focus away from its immediate 
financial concerns and to re-focus on the greater economic issue — its 
retention of tribal sovereignty. In identifying and respecting the Tribe’s 
ultimate goal of protecting its sovereign interests in Foxwoods, the Union 
was able to apply a tactic of acculturation that induced the Tribe to embrace 
progressive labor standards and avoid an encroachment on sovereignty by 
the NLRB. The end result is an agreement that both sides will come to 
appreciate more as negotiations continue and the ominous prospects of 
labor unrest are replaced by an ongoing mutual appreciation for each side’s 
bargaining positions. 
VI. Conclusion 
Understanding the historical context in which indigenous tribes have 
shaped their contemporary cultural identity will not only breed empathy and 
combat adversarial relationships, but also provide valuable insight and 
context for situations such as the UAW organizing campaign at Foxwoods. 
Beyond the law, there is a history that underlies every conflict, whether 
legal or political. Ignoring tribal history runs the risk of repeating it, a rather 
unfortunate result considering the horrific past this nation has in regards to 
its treatment of indigenous tribes inhabiting North America prior to 
colonization and nationhood.  
An even cursory study of the Mashantucket Pequot history can be 
extremely informative as to why the Tribe reacted in the way it did to the 
UAW campaign, the Board’s decision, and subsequent labor campaigns. 
The unique character of a member versus non-member labor campaign, and 
the interconnection between tribal enterprise and cultural survival, 
complicates the typical labor/management dichotomy that is more squarely 
in the Board’s wheelhouse.  
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Whether it be exercising discretion and letting tribal law govern labor 
elections, or paying more than mere lip service to these important matters, 
the Board and federal courts should re-evaluate how they apply the NLRA 
on tribal reservations. The organizing campaign at Foxwoods represents a 
lost opportunity to cultivate a new labor regulation policy on tribal casinos. 
It was not the first campaign at a tribal casino and certainly will not be the 
last one consisting primarily of non-member employees. Respecting the 
history and sensitive tribal issues such as cultural survival will better 
effectuate the purpose of the NLRA, as well as be more informative in 
determining whether tribal labor relations should govern.215 A reevaluation 
of the NLRB’s policy and its perceived role in labor organizing at tribal 
casinos is more important now than ever.  
The success of an eventual agreement under Mashantucket Pequot tribal 
law illustrates the possibility of respecting both the will of workers to 
organize for their collective good and the historic and cultural forces that 
guide the will of the Tribe. Both the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe and the 
employees at Foxwoods had much to lose as the Tribe entered a new period 
of financial uncertainty. The NLRB’s “business as usual” demeanor, after 
overturning thirty years of non-interference in these types of matters, 
ignores the historic and cultural implications at the peril of both parties. The 
next time it has the opportunity to revisit these issues, the Board should take 
notice of the success of the 2010 UAW/Foxwoods contract and consider 
extending more deference to tribal labor law.216 This means a thorough 
understanding of the history behind the Mashantucket Pequot — or any 
other tribal cultural recovery — should play a prominent role in deciding to 
what extent federal labor regulation applies to tribal casinos, as well as 
what role the Board should play in ensuring labor rights. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 215. The purpose of the Act is to “promote[] the overriding goal of industrial peace.”  
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 381 (U.S. 1998). 
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